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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Let me note straight off that the theory of argumentation is not one of the areas of 
philosophy in which I work. It is not even a secondary area for me. I have a wide range of 
philosophical specializations in which I think, read, teach, and publish, and a second tier 
of areas in which I also engage in at least three of the listed activities; but, to my regret, 
argumentation theory isn’t among either group. I have done a certain amount of work in 
formal logic, above all, in modal logic; but this, I know, is at some distance from the 
comparative analysis of arguments (including meta-arguments) and their structures. One 
of the areas which is in my primary group is early modern philosophy, and very centrally 
among the thinkers of the 1600-1800 period, Hume. So I come to Professor Finocchiaro’s 
interesting paper principally as a Hume scholar. I hope that that background may enable 
me to say some things which may be pertinent in one way or other to the topics of 
Professor Finocchiaro’s paper. 
In fact Finocchiaro’s paper has led me to what I think is an insight about Hume—
at any rate, something which I have found an extremely arresting idea—so I am 
extremely grateful to him, and his paper, for having occasioned this thought. This 
thought, which others may well also have had in one form or other—the secondary 
literature on Hume is so immense that it is entirely possible—is concerned with the 
design argument in Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, its advocacy by 
Cleanthes, and its critique by Philo. It is also concerned with the structure of 
argumentation in Hume’s work, or a structure of argumentation which may occur in 
Hume’s work—I think it does, but this would be contested by some, perhaps many 
readers and interpreters of Hume. At any rate, these are all reasons to bring this thought 
or insight forward in this context. Whether original or not, my ‘thought’ was prompted by 
the realization that there is something importantly incomplete in Finocchiaro’s, as also in 
Barker’s earlier analysis of the structure and content of Philo’s argument (‘meta-
argument’) which critiques the design argument of the Dialogues. I think that both 
Finocchiaro’s and Barker’s analyses are plausible accounts of the structure and 
deficiencies of Cleanthes’ design argument—they differ above all in the precise role of 
analogy in Cleanthes’ successive arguments as the work advances. On that matter I will 
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say that I think that Finocchiaro has a stricter notion of analogy than many 
philosophers—including, I would suggest, Philo, Cleanthes, and Hume—have. For that 
many, analogical arguments as to probable causes can as well invoke similarity as 
sameness. For example, many would argue (as they would say), by analogy, that non-
human animals suffer because behaviour they exhibit when given electric shock (say) is 
similar to what humans do when that happens to them. To put this just a little more 
formally, consider two arguments, each with the same two first premises: (1) Carl the cat 
and Henry the human have had electric shock applied to them; (2) Carl screams and 
writhes, as does Henry. The third premise will be either (3) Henry’s screaming and 
writhing is produced by inner feeling-states; or (3)’ Henry’s screaming and writhing is 
produced by human inner feeling-states. In either case, I would say, we can infer a 
conclusion, by analogy, viz., (4) Carl’s screaming and writhing is produced by the same 
causes as Henry’s, namely, inner feeling-states; or (4)’ Carl’s screaming and writhing is 
produced by causes similar to those of Henry’s behaviour. That is to say, one person’s 
similarity-analogy will (be able to) amount, by alternative formulations readily supplied, 
to pretty much the same thing as another person’s sameness-analogy.  
I will make one other remark on Finocchiaro’s very detailed analysis of Philo’s 
meta-argument. Hume is often criticized, in other contexts, for showing unawareness of 
what we now call inference to the best explanation. It will be of considerable importance, 
I would say, if the case is warranted that he shows awareness of that pattern of reasoning 
in the critique of Cleanthes, as Finocchiaro argues. The matter seems to me to deserve an 
exploration that I will not have the opportunity to undertake on this occasion. 
But Finocchiaro leaves out (as many others of Hume’s readers also do) the fact 
that towards the end of the work things take a somewhat surprising turn. 
 
2. PHILO’S REVERSAL 
    
One of the puzzles which Hume’s Dialogues poses for its readers is something which 
appears in Part XII. Philo has—it appears—more or less wiped the floor with Cleanthes, 
and Demea. It is not surprising, accordingly—but also because of what we know (or think 
we know) about Hume’s views on theism and religion from other sources—that most 
interpreters take Philo to be Hume’s mouthpiece. Cleanthes represents natural religion 
and its advocacy, Demea fideistic (but also a priorist) commitment, and Philo is the 
sceptic, raining, devastatingly, on both of the other discussants’ parades; frequently, by 
stratagems which have him appear to adopt a component of the position of one of the 
other two to show fatal weaknesses in the position of the other. The three are also 
supposed to be, as Hume has set the dialogue up, good friends, all of them (allegedly) 
sound theists, who have been having a vigorous philosophical set-to (just as a group of 
good friends may get together for a vigorous round of chess, or squash, one of them 
managing thoroughly to thrash the others). Hume’s model is Cicero’s De Natura 
Deorum, where the same sort of thing goes on, also among friends, in the same spirited—
sometimes extremely spirited and partisan—way, and also concerned with the existence 
and nature of God(s), including the role and relevance of the problem of evil for the topic. 
What happens in Part XII is that Demea leaves, and the two special friends, Cleanthes 
and Philo, remain, and Cleanthes says, in effect: okay, Philo, you have been clever and 
impressive, but the match is now over, so tell me what your real view is. Philo obliges. 
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He says that a version of the argument from design is indeed cogent. It doesn’t get us 
very far. It is limited. It will provide no basis for popular or developed theoretical religion 
or theology. And it will, especially, provide no basis for linking morality, or moral 
dimensions of human life, to what was responsible for the order we rightly discern in the 
world—i.e., order requiring the creative operation of some sort of significant intelligence 
or other. The whole of natural theology—i.e., of what is justifiably there—may be 
summed up, Philo concludes, in the proposition “that the cause or causes of order in the 
universe probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence.” The position Philo 
espouses—confesses, we may say—is a variety of deism. It is a minimalist deism, it is 
true—no affirmation of a life after death, nor of any impressive goodness of the world, 
nor need the creator be omniscient, omnipotent, or singular—but it is a deism 
nonetheless. The argument for it Philo gives in XII-2-4 (especially paragraph 3); it is to 
be noted that nothing in the remainder of Part XII repudiates the argument. There is a 
Deity, a divine Being (both of these are Philo’s phrases), and there is rationally 
compelling reason to believe that there is above all from the complexities of the species 
of living things and their fit within their terrestrial habitat, indication of pattern and 
system which while it would be logically possible that it be there without plan and a 
planner, this is something which cannot be maintained “seriously”; which will make a 
particularly powerful case for analogies with human “art and contrivance” (though not, 
Philo insists, to human moral traits or goals). Against priests, priestcraft, and the vulgar 
masses of superstitious believers whom they feed and are fed by, Philo remains 
implacable. But there is a True Religion—it is a philosopher’s religion; though Philo is 
even prepared to say that “[t]o be a philosophical sceptic is, in a man of letters, the first 
and most essential step towards being a sound, believing Christian.” 
None of this is mentioned at all in Finocchiaro’s paper. To be sure, his topic of 
investigation is Cleanthes’ design argument in the Dialogues, and Philo’s extremely 
thorough destructive critique of it. But the—surprising—fact that Hume then presents the 
same Philo as providing his own design argument would seem clearly to indicate that the 
work of the argument theorist, as indeed of anyone trying to interpret and understand 
what is going on in this rich and interesting text, specifically under the heading of its 
design arguments for a God of some kind, has not come to its end.  
Commentators have long noted that arguments from design, or teleological 
arguments, for the existence of God, may be placed in two distinct groups, according as 
the world as a whole, or very significant proper parts of the world, are taken, by the 
argument, to be the primary objects which exhibit the pattern, structure, and complexity 
the explanation of which is held either absolutely necessarily to require, or 
overwhelmingly probably to have involved, a creative role of high intelligence and power 
in its production. These arguments then exhibit disjunctions of empirical object of 
(supposed) design, and of whether the character of the argument is deductive or 
inductive. Interestingly, although the argument of Cleanthes which Philo critiques (and 
both of which Professor Finocchiaro discusses) takes the world as a whole as the relevant 
empirical object, Philo, in Part XII, gives primary focus to very significant proper parts of 
the world, namely, the structure, complexity, and adjustment to habitat, of living species 
and their parts and organs, as the ‘object’ requiring a divine cause. Cleanthes, then, is like 
Paley; and Philo (rather amazingly) is like Aquinas, in the Fifth Way. Both Cleanthes and 
Philo evidently (Philo, explicitly) think of the arguments they affirm as inductive; 
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extremely powerful inductive arguments. Although Philo, in XII, doesn’t present his 
argument for (a) God explicitly as an argument from analogy, or involving analogy with 
human production of artefacts, the fact seems evident; whether it be the whole of nature, 
or just (the whole of) living nature, the evidentiary force of appeal to or a claim of divine 
creative agency looks essentially to involve, in both cases, analogy with just such familiar 
features of our experience. 
 
3. OPTIONS 
   
So: what gives? What happened to the devastating argumentation Philo gave earlier in the 
Dialogues, and which Finocchiaro, and Barker, have analyzed at such length? Was Philo, 
then, insincere? And anyway, they were very powerful arguments; and seem indeed to be 
as devastating when applied to living nature as to nature as a whole. No argument from 
design does show, or even point to, even inductively, the existence of a God. None of the 
actual evidence from the world discloses anything other than an entirely natural world, 
one which gave rise to mind and intelligence, at any rate in its tiny, meager terrestrial 
component, but without a shred of reason, from analogy or anything else, to suppose that 
it was mind and intelligence, of any kind, which produced mind and intelligence (in our 
version of it), or other complex and arresting features of living things. And—Philo 
aside—what about his creator? What are we supposed to infer that Hume thinks? Is he, 
then, a deist, a “philosophical Christian”; does he really think that some version of an 
argument from design is in fact (inductively) cogent? 
The puzzle then is what to make of the argument Philo accepts in Part XII, which 
Philo’s own arguments in earlier parts will have refuted—and why Hume has Philo take 
this apparently inconsistent stance. We need, it seems, to undertake a project in ‘meta-
meta-argumentation.’ (That Hume is a very complicated guy.) Interpreters have proposed 
a variety of explanations. Some have tried to argue that there really is no inconsistency: 
that Part XII’s deism is so minimalist—Philo does say that the quoted formulation is 
“somewhat ambiguous,” and endeavours to show that the theist and the atheist, at least 
when thoughtful, and when they tone down the rhetoric and hyperbole in their first 
enunciated position, can be budged or coaxed into positions differences between which 
can be viewed as merely verbal.1 Others take the Philo of Part XII to be a creature of 
cunning and artifice on Hume’s part. The earlier, sceptical, and argumentatively 
successful, Philo, is the one we (the philosophically attuned reader with ears to hear and 
eyes to see) are to take to be the real one, and Hume’s voice; the sham Philo is there in 
the finale as a device of coy, traditionary conclusion—the ‘happy ending’ asked for by 
conventional piety, and which Hume, tongue in cheek, is supplying; we note that the last 
words of the Dialogues claim—its second conjunct definitely unconvincingly—“that 
Philo’s principles are more probable than Demea’s; but […] those of Cleanthes approach 
still nearer to the truth.” (The latter is even teasingly ambiguous: it at least permits being 
                                                 
1 William A. Parent, “An Interpretation of Hume’s Dialogues,” The Review of Metaphysics, vol. xxx, no. 1 
(117), Sept. 1976, 96-114, argues not only that Philo is consistent throughout the work, and that Philo is 
Hume, but that the deism which Hume advocates is considerably more than ‘minimalist,’ involving a 
commitment to a supreme and perfect creator. It is importantly to be observed, however, that Philo’s 
‘reversal’ does not reverse the claim which the earlier sceptical Philo has made that there is no evidence of 
a moral, or good, character of the (supposed) creator/designer; very much, rather, the contrary. 
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construed as saying that Cleanthes’ principles approach nearer to the truth than do 
Demea’s.) Still another interpretive option, similar to the last, is that Hume is being 
essentially literary in his finale. We are to be left with a deliberately inconclusive ‘lady or 
the tiger’ pair of options—atheism or minimalist deism. Still another view is very 
interestingly and powerfully argued by Rich Foley.2 Foley contends that Philo is not 
Hume’s mouthpiece, that the inconsistency between refuting any version of an argument 
from design, which the earlier Philonian case does so overwhelmingly, and the revived 
design argument from Part XII, is so glaring that the adroit philosophical reader is to be 
seen as intended to catch it, and to connect the relevant dots—i.e., to apply the 
demonstrations of fallacy and empirically implausible or irrelevant considerations which 
Philo has earlier supplied to Philo’s own latter-day enunciation of a version of the same. 
We were enrolled in a course of study of natural religion, and by the time Part XII 
arrives, we have reached graduate school, and are now well-grounded atheists, equipped 
to put our lessons to work.  
Quite a number of options, then.3 Which if any of them is right? I myself am 
drawn to an interpretation which will yield a consistent Philo, at least after a fashion, and 
produce a philosophically honest, interesting, but more complicated Hume than is 
sometimes seen. Some of the features of this position’s complexity will involve features, 
and considerations, of or for argumentation theory. In my sublime ignorance of the latter 
I simply don’t know whether anyone identifies the features or considerations to which I 
refer. I hope that they do, and that I will be able to receive instruction and illumination on 
the matter. At any rate, if I am right, this feature or consideration will be able to be seen 
in at least two or three other important places in Hume’s philosophical work, and will 
have significant consequences for aspects of its overall interpretation. 
There is, I believe, a mode of argumentation which might usefully be styled 
hyperbolic argument. The latter consists in providing ‘raised bar’ argumentation, where 
                                                 
2 Rich Foley, “Unnatural Religion: Indoctrination and Philo’s Reversal in Hume’s Dialogues Concerning 
Natural Religion,” Hume Studies, vol. 32, no. 1, April 2006, 83-112. Among the many virtues of this 
important essay are Foley’s detailed review of the huge secondary literature on whether Philo is Hume, and 
on alternative attempts to explain the meaning of Philo’s ‘reversal’ in Part XII, and the implications of XII-
2-5 for the interpretation of the Dialogues as a whole. 
3 Still another, which has had its advocates, is that for Hume theistic conviction of some sort is (what he 
calls, and which has for him considerable theoretical resonance) a natural belief—something we will just 
inevitably and inexpungibly believe, irrespective of evidence or its lack. While plausible perhaps for belief 
in an external world, other minds, causality, etc., this seems a considerably less persuasive view to take of 
belief in a God or gods. 
Yet one more interpretive view to mention, at least in an endnote, is that of Simon Blackburn. He, 
in How to Read Hume (Granta, 2008—ch. 9) argues that Hume’s aim in the Dialogues is primarily to argue 
that theistic metaphysical issues don’t, or shouldn’t (an unclarity in Blackburn’s analysis is which of these 
is the right or the primary vector) matter for human life. So, one can affirm a minimalist deism, as Philo 
does in the end, and it is all really, for Hume, a matter of indifference, since no theistic stance which reason 
or evidence can support can justify, or even plausibly lead to, religious practice or socio-cultural or legal 
actions or policies. Sounds good; perhaps. Blackburn’s interpretation, though, suffers from is/ought as well 
as other unclarities. Philo either has or has not reversed himself, in Part XII, and the stance he takes in the 
latter section—and we would like to know just what that stance is--either does or does not represent 
Hume’s own actual view. (Sometimes one has a view which one will nonetheless hold doesn’t matter very 
much; and sometimes also of course there are issues on which one really doesn’t have a view, one way or 
the other.)    
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the standards for the acceptability of premises, or of the success of an inductive inference, 
will be higher than ‘normally’ required or demanded or offered. Typically ‘hyperbolic 
argument’ will be mounted as critique of an adversary’s argument. The term ‘normally’ 
is, and deliberately, on a sliding or variable scale. Perhaps there are, for a community of 
reasoners, canons and requirements ‘suitable’ for everyday life, or for a scientific context, 
and still others appropriate for philosophy. Maybe within the latter some requirements are 
appropriate (i.e., held to be appropriate, by some community of reasoners) for moral 
debates, others for metaphysics or philosophy of science, and still others for the most 
rigorous epistemology, where ultra-radical scepticism is on the scene, a contender to be 
confronted. Sometimes a reasoner ‘doesn’t play by the rules.’ They insist—for one 
reason, or purpose, or other—that a higher standard, or bar, be operative, in a particular 
area of investigation, than has been usual. Sometimes such a reasoner has a missionary or 
ideal purpose: they think that the thinking in this area has been sloppy, and has led to 
woolly thinking or falsehood. Or they may be a cantankerous or playful or anarchic writer 
or thinker, who wants just to ‘stir things up’—an emmerdeur, as one says in French. Or 
possibly, in some instances, the reasoner concerned thinks they (or someone) has come 
up with seriously good even if destructive, possibly sceptical-conclusion-reaching 
arguments which they don’t know how to answer, and don’t think anyone else does 
either, and which they want to lay on the table, because they are an honest reasoner, and 
the argument or arguments are relevant to a matter at hand. One won’t (or may not) 
accept their conclusions; but one also won’t know what to say about them. One will lay 
them out, present them in their full power without pretending that they are spurious or 
fallacious or other than devastating; and then move on, perhaps indicating while or soon 
after doing so what one’s real view is on the matter about which a devastating result was 
reached (or perhaps not). Although there may possibly be a case for an ‘emmerdeur’ 
Hume, I will suggest that Hume is (on particular occasions) more plausibly interpreted as 
a hyperbolic reasoner of this latter kind. 
If Hume is a philosopher who engages, sometimes at least, in hyperbolic 
argumentation, there is one particularly natural place in his writings to see him doing this: 
namely, in the famous (for some, infamous) sceptical sections of A Treatise of Human 
Nature.4 They too pose a puzzle. The work starts out with a declared intention of 
producing a ‘science of man’—a Newton-like scientific psychology. Along the way we 
encounter argumentation which, if sound, would make it impossible that there be 
knowledge, including scientific knowledge, of anything beyond an immediate sensory 
state. Hume interpreters ask here too: what gives? And produce a (somewhat 
bewildering) variety of answers. If Hume is engaging here in hyperbolic argumentation, 
these sections, and what he is doing, may make (at least greater) sense. He is exploring 
human cognition, these ideas and arguments come to mind, they are relevant, and he 
thinks no one (including himself) has any idea how to refute them. He also doesn’t 
believe their conclusions; and settles on an allegedly middle-ground position he calls 
mitigated (or Academic) scepticism—which in fact would be no more defensible than 
would the most dogmatic rationalist position if the really sceptical arguments had been 
                                                 
4 They occur in Part IV of Book I of the Treatise (‘Of the sceptical and other systems of philosophy’), but 
above all in its first two sections (‘Of scepticism with regard to reason’ and ‘Of scepticism with regard to 
the senses’). 
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successful—but which Hume thinks will at least equip him with a suitably cautionary 
mantle of never-over-rash commitment. 
Other issues in Hume’s work in the Treatise and first Enquiry also come to mind 
for hyperbolic argumentation analysis. Hume—confusingly—seems some of the time to 
argue against so-called ‘double-existence’ theories of sense perception, according to 
which immediate objects of sensory experiences are ‘images,’ which may a little or a lot 
resemble actually existing external physical objects; and some of the time appears to 
accept just such a theory, which was the prevailing one, very notably among ‘scientific’ 
thinkers, in his day. Here too, I believe, there is a reasonable case for thinking that Hume 
is being ‘arch,’ at any rate hyperbolical, and that he is actually a ‘double-existence’ 
theorist. One might—here I at least would be more cautious—take a ‘hyperbolical’ stance 
also with regard to apparent Humean scepticism about ‘hidden powers,’ objective natural 
necessities, selves, or induction. (Some Hume scholars definitely do reject Humean 
scepticism on one or more of these items; commonly they profess simply not to see 
anything other than merely superficial appearances of scepticism in the relevant places in 
Hume’s texts. I recommend the ‘hyperbolic’ approach to them. That said, I for my part 
think that Hume really is sceptical about some, perhaps most of the listed things.) 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
Back to the Dialogues. I suggest that hyperbolic argumentation is at work (at play?) here, 
as far as Hume is concerned, in the earlier Philonian sections. It is (just) hyperbolic—
exaggerated—not wholly spurious, or fallacious. The straight goods, as Hume sees it, are 
there in Part XII. A truncated, minimalist version of an argument from design is cogent 
(Hume thinks, and has his mouthpiece, Philo, say). Hume is wrong so to think; this time 
he should have hearkened more fully to the arguments he had produced for Philo earlier.  
Why doesn’t he? I think the answer, in a nut shell, is that Hume hasn’t thought of, 
or anticipated, Darwinian natural selection. He is an honest inquirer, and he just can’t see 
but that astonishingly involved intricate complexities of animal organs, adaptations of 
living things to habitats, and similar features of observable biology (and some also of 
physics), point to some sort of intelligence having been at work in their production. He 
finds it puzzling, is sure there is no good evidence for a moral component in the operation 
(Hume’s God will be some sort of version of ‘Mother Nature’), and most of it is and will 
remain impenetrable mystery.5 But Philo—Hume—means it—hence the earlier 
argumentation—Philo’s critique of Cleanthes’ argument from design—is hyperbolic, as 
far as the sincere Hume is concerned. This will be entirely compatible with the structural 
analysis of that critique, which Professor Finocchario provides. (It will be compatible 
also with the contrasting Barker analysis.) As a hyperbolic reasoner, Philo/Hume means 
to display flaws in Cleanthes’ argument. They will seem to make the argument 
irreversibly or unrevisably flawed; what Philo/Hume really thinks is that this is not so, 
and that a suitably scaled down version, which will get only a somewhat modest part of 
what a theist wants, will (inductively) succeed, as Philo will affirm in Part XII. 
 
          Link to paper 
 
5 This line of interpretation is similar to the one taken by Daniel C. Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea 
(Simon and Schuster, 1995), pp. 28-34 (“Hume’s Close Encounter”). 
